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Is There Now A Comparative Legal
Scholarship?
MARK VAN HOECKE*
Husa, Jaakko, A New Introduction to Comparative Law. Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015. 28 4 p.
Paperbound. E24.99. ISBN 978-1-849-46796-4
Samuel, Geoffrey, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method. Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 2014. 210 p. Paperbound. E18.99. ISBN 978-1-849-46643-1
Siems, Mathias, Comparative Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014. 416 p.
Paperbound. US$49.99. ISBN 978-0-5211-7717-7
Over the last century many books on "Comparative Law" have been published which
were more in the nature of overviews of (Western) legal systems and their influence
worldwide than works on actual comparison. What in Germany is calledAuslandsrechtkunde.
Although these descriptive overviews are useful, they do not introduce one to "comparative
law" in the sense of "comparative legal scholarship". With only a few exceptions, including
Harold Cooke Gutteridge (1876-1953)' and Ldontin Jean Constantinescu 2 in twentieth
century, no theory or methodology was developed for guiding comparative legal research.
Recently three books have been published which respond to the needs for theory and
methodology in comparative legal research. And so, with some exaggeration, one might
say that finally, after more than a century, books have been published on comparative
law in the sense of comparative legal scholarship. These three books are: An Introduction
to Comparative Law Theory and Method by Geoffrey Samuel; Comparative Law by Mathias
Siems; and A New Introduction to Comparative Law by Jaakko Husa. Each focuses on theory
and methodology, using some examples from comparative research, but abstaining from
trying to give a full overview of the legal systems in the world.
Samuel's book is the most concise, somewhat more theoretical, as the title suggests, and
designed primarily for postgraduate research students. The book has been largely prepared
while teaching the course "Theory of Comparative Law" in the Master Course in Legal
Theory of the European Academy of Legal Theory, during the period that it was offered
in Brussels (1992-2009). Husa's Introduction is aimed at students who are taking their first
* M.A., Ph.D. Ghent University; Professor of Comparative Law, Queen Mary University of London; Professor
of Legal Theory and Comparative Law, Ghent University.
' H. C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research,
Cambridge University Press, 1949
2 L.-J. Constantinescu, Traite de droit compare (1972-1983). 3 vols.; notably, the second volume La Methode
comparative (Paris, 1974).
The course is now organized at Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main.
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steps in the field of comparative law. Siems is the richest in information offered, including
materials on comparative research using new methods such as quantitative ("numerical")
research. All three excellent books show the profound knowledge and experience of
the authors in comparative research, but Siems is the most impressive measured by the
amount of literature used4 and the cutting edge level as to new approaches and methods
in comparative legal research, which Siems has used extensively, mainly during the past
decade. What emerges from these books is that several approaches are open to those new
to comparative legal research, although not all have been analyzed and discussed to the
same extent in these three works. This said, the authors have done more expansive work in
other publications, Husa perhaps being the most productive of the three authors.
These new approaches deserve attention. In this review article some aspects of these
approaches to comparative legal research - which are also rapidly influencing education
in law faculties and their doctoral schools and the focus of PhD research, at least in Europe
- will be discussed.
A DEFINITION OF "LAW" AND "LEGAL SYSTEM"
A focus on a definition of "law" or "legal system" is rather new in comparative legal studies.
In the past this was often taken for granted, for it seemed obvious that comparative law
was about comparing the rules of State legal systems. It is, however, necessary to clearly
define "law" so as to demarcate the object of comparative law. Samuel delves extensively
into that discussion (pp. 121-151: what is meant by "law" (to the comparatist)? Is law a
matter of rules, law as rights, law as concepts, law as interpretation, law as language, law as
practical solutions, law as a system, law as social interests, law as underlying mentalities,
or law as culture? Moreover, with globalization, regionalization, and the pluralization of
legal systems and of the private production of legal norms, demarcating legal systems has
become increasingly difficult, but also increasingly necessary (pp. 222-259). Accordingly,
it is a matter not only of "law in the books" versus "law in action", but also of a choice to
be made among legal systems, or at least rules, equally valid within the same territory.
Traditional comparative law has been criticized for being too country-oriented
(including when a country encompasses two or more legal systems, such as English and
Scottish law in the United Kingdom) and too Western, in the sense of looking at non-
Western legal systems from a Western point of view without taking sufficiently into
account the internal logic and the underlying culture. William Twining has called this the
"Country & Western" approach of comparative law. But even in the new approach to
comparative research the emphasis remains on statutory and judicial rules of State legal
systems, although these rules are considered within a more contextual approach than was
the case in traditional comparative law.
About 2000 titles in the references (pp. 218-400), all of which doubtless have been read.
William L. Twining, "Comparative Law and Legal Theory: The Country and Western Tradition", in Jan Edge
(ed.), Comparative Law in Global Perspective (2000), pp. 21-76.
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A NEED FOR THEORY IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH
As criticized by Samuel, most comparatists seem to be content with an intuitive approach
to comparative law, which, in their view, would not need theory.' Actually, most
comparative work, including by academics, has been pursued from a practical point of
view, looking for answers to questions such as: are some rules the same or different when
compared to one or more other countries? Such a question resulted in an emphasis on
the "functional method" as the only "method" in comparative research. How, then, do
lawyers and judges solve practical legal problems? The answer lies with the practical
results, not the underlying doctrinal constructions. However, such doctrinal constructions
are a way to look at social reality, to structure it legally with specific concepts and legal
constructions. From an academic point of view, this should be the most interesting area
of comparative legal research, but it is understandable that the practical results are more
important to legal practitioners. Legal practice is law without theory. Law faculties and
law professors have often, and rightly, been criticized for precisely that. Within national
legal systems, legal doctrine acts as a theoretical framework for legal research and imparts
to it scholarly legitimation. Comparative law, however, almost by definition, lacks such a
common doctrinal framework.' Accordingly, another theoretical framework is needed. In
contrast to what is generally accepted, this cannot be the so-called Tertium comparationis' in
its rather narrow practical sense.
Yet, in order to compare, it has indeed been emphasized that we need some external
point of view. We should not look at a foreign legal system with the eyes and doctrinal
framework of our own legal system, but try to transcend by using external "neutral"
elements for comparing legal systems: "the comparatist must eradicate the preconceptions
of his native legal system".' Indeed, describing law is not an "objective" activity; it does
not offer "pure facts" of a type that everybody would perceive in the same way, like a
flower as compared to a tree, or a dog as compared to a cat.0 Looking at concepts, rules,
institutions, and the like in other societies will, at least at the first stage, always happen
against the background of one's own legal system and doctrinal framework. Comparatists
principally wanted to emphasize with the tertium comparationis the need to be aware of this
bias and to try to extricate oneself from one's own conceptual framework. What this tertium
comparationis could be and how to find it remains less clear. Should one compare apples
with oranges by reference to a banana, or to pears and lemons? Or to an abstract concept
6 Samuel quotes Tony Weir in this context, who stated that he has no theory to propound, since it "is possible
for us, like Hamlet, to tell a hawk from a handsaw, and to do so without a complete theory of aerial predators
or an exhaustive inventory of the carpenter's toolbox" (p. 19).
, In some cases the doctrinal background may be the same, but the rules or their interpretations may differ
(e.g., among French and Belgian civil law or English and Australian common law), but the bulk of comparative
research is focusing on different doctrinal constructions.
The concept has been used by Ernst Rabel (1874-1955) in 1924: Ernst Rabel,,,Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der
Rechtsvergleichung", Rheinische Zeitschriftfilr Zivil- und Prozessrecht, XIII (1924), pp. 279-301, reprinted in Hans G.
Leser (ed.), Ernst Rabel GesammelteAufsdtze, vol. III: Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung und zur Rechtsvereinheitlichung
1919-1954 (1967), III, p. 6.
9 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3d ed; 1998), p. 35.
o Although even these objects are only seen in the same way within cultures who know these objects, where
cats and dogs are domesticated, and so on. The way we see things is always determined by our own experience
and worldview. For human beings there are no "objective facts" independent from human cultures.
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of "fruit"? What could be the tertium comparationis when comparing the repudiation of a
wife in Islamic law with divorce in Western law?
What has initially been a well-founded warning against biases in comparative research
has, erroneously perhaps, been perceived as part of comparative method. There is no
reason why comparative research should be limited to legal phenomena with common
characteristics or to legal systems "at the same stage of development", as Esin Orticti has
rightly claimed." As comparative law has largely developed with the aim of improving
one's own legal system, it is understandable that this kind of research required some level
of comparability in order to be useful. However, comparative research carried out with
other aims, such as understanding different legal cultures, cannot and should not use such
conditions.
Nils Jansen analysed the concepts and methods of comparison in historical linguistics
and comparative religion and concluded:
Thus, tertia comparationis cannot be defined as part of the method; comparison must
remain open for new insights. Nevertheless, as a result of successful comparisons,
the discipline has - perhaps unconsciously - developed a comparative second-order
language describing the concepts that constitute the different religions' beliefs. It
has become highly useful for analysing the complex commonalities and differences
of religion; all in all it represents a large body of comparative knowledge. 2
Comparatists concentrating on methodology have tried to develop such a - relatively
neutral - second-order language, or meta language, describing the concepts that constitute
the different legal systems, even if in applied comparative research mostly first-order
languages are used. Instead of looking for tertia comparationis, legal comparatists ought,
through their research, to develop such a comparative second-order language.'" What is
presented as tertium comparationis is sometimes just such a second-order language. 4 It is
true that legal systems can only be correctly understood in their own language, from their
own internal perspective,'" but in order for comparative law to develop as a discipline
" A. Esin Oructi, "Methodology of Comparative Law", in J. M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law (2006), p. 443.
12 Nils Jansen, "Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge", in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.),
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006), p. 330
13 We avoid here discussing the (im)possibility of creating a "meta-language". See: Anne Lise Kjarr, "A
Common Legal Language in Europe?" in M. Van Hoecke (ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law
(2004), pp. 377-398. Every discipline develops its own concepts. These "second-order languages" are not full
languages such as Esperanto, but coherent conceptual tool kits. In a way, Roman law functioned in the Middle
Ages as a second-order language for interpreting local customary law.
14 For example: "I had been able to determine through previous work that mismatches between subjective
intention and objective declaration, or the concern to consecrate yet also discipline party intention, were
considered legal issues under English law and French law alike. Those issues therefore arguably provided
appropriate tertia comparationis for investigating the English and the French law of, respectively, contractual
mistake and contractual interpretation, even though they might prove inadequate for the purpose of investigating
other areas of English and French contract law". See: Catherine Valcke, "Reflections on Comparative Law
Methodology - Getting Inside Contract Law", in M. Adams and J. Bomhoff, Practice and Theory in Comparative
Law (2012), p. 33. This shows how a second-order language may partly overlap with the legal languages of
the compared legal systems. Also it shows how some concepts may be useful at a meta-level for some specific
comparison, without having some broader, let alone "universal", validity.
1 See on this, most notably Valcke, note 14 above, pp. 22-48.
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some second-order language(s) will have to be worked out. Only in case of harmonization
of law does a new common (first-order) legal language have to be developed."
As for Husa, he interprets the tertium comparationis differently (p. 148):
For the comparison to make sense, the objects compared must have at least some
common characteristics or features, which form the common denominator for
comparison ... it is not a question of the similarity of the objects compared but of
the fact that certain qualities are compared from different points of view. ... In the
mainstream theory of comparative law this common feature is referred to with the
... Latin expression tertium comparationis. It is necessary not only in comparative law
but in all comparative research in general. Tertium is not equal to some comparative
common denominator, but is instead a methodological term of a higher abstraction
level that is not actually concretely connected with the object compared and is used
as the common denominator that makes comparison possible. It refers to a common
quality that two things, which are being compared, share. Importantly, without it
comparison in a disciplined sense is not possible.
Thus Husa tried to make sense of tertium comparationis by making it an abstract "basic
norm" of comparison, such as the Grundnorm in Hans Kelsen's theory. This is about
comparison making sense. The compared objects - legal rules, legal systems, and the like
- have to share some features or characteristics which are relevant for the comparatist. As
he says (p. 148):
The point of the characteristics compared is a factor for which each comparatist
is personally responsible (because of the comparative framework constructed by
the comparatists themselves), but the possibility for comparison is an absolute
prerequisite.
For Husa the tertium comparationis is not part of a comparative method, but an abstract
condition for comparison, in which tertium has lost its meaning as an external yardstick. It
says only that there should be something to compare meaningfully, common features of
two or more compared things, not a third element one would use for this purpose.
Siems (p. 291) points to the "great variety of units" that "can and have been compared"
in the social sciences. He suggests that "a comparison of legal institutions, values,
categories, concepts, ways of reasoning or languages ... can be the tertium comparationis
that links diverse legal systems" (p. 33). Samuel, on the other hand, does not enter into
this discussion. He mentions the term tertium comparationis twice, when referring to Ralf
Michael's critique of the functional method (p. 66) and when referring to an article of
Jaakko Husa on the same matter (p. 76).
16 For a good overview of the problems related to such "harmonized" legal language, see: Gerhard Dannemann,
"In Search of System Neutrality: Methodological Issues in the Drafting of European Contract Law Rules", in
Adams and Bomhoff, note 14 above, pp. 96-119. See also, in the same volume, the contribution of Monica Claes
and Maartje De Visser, "Reflections on Comparative Method in European Constitutional Law" (pp. 143-169).
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CONSTRUCTING RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Doctoral theses in law, including in comparative law, used to be mainly descriptive,
at least in European law faculties in twentieth century. This has changed dramatically,
mainly in the last decade. Nowadays PhD students are expected to answer carefully
worded research questions, using an appropriate methodology. For (domestic) positive
law dissertations this can entail problems, just as much with supervisors as with the PhD
students themselves, because lawyers have not been educated for critical research which
transcends the sheer description of the currently valid law. Law faculties and their doctoral
schools are now trying to fill this gap. In comparative law the research questions have to be
so worded that they look for some causalities, for some explanations, or the like, and not
just for some descriptive knowledge about foreign law.
Geoffrey Samuel pays specific attention to this matter (pp. 25-44), most notably
by reference to framing the right question(s) and locating it within the State of the Art
in the field by undertaking a (critical) literature review. These research questions may
have to be revised in the course of the research. Validating the outcomes of the research
is important too. This can be done from the standpoint of "correspondence" with facts
(empirical testing), from a point of view of "coherence" with prevailing theories, or
through "consensus" among scholars (pp. 39-40). Samuel regularly points to the fact that
law is just one way to look at reality, a grille de lecture, which may be (quite) different across
the legal systems compared. Legal concepts are not "objective facts". The major problem
for comparatists is that domestic concepts are so deeply rooted in their legal education
that it is difficult to look at the same reality in another way. Just as young children learn
a language easily, adults may encounter difficulties in mastering the same language. The
same seems to be true for legal language. When formulating research questions, an effort
should be made to avoid concepts typical for one's own legal system but unknown in the
compared legal system(s).
METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY
Turning to traditional methods in comparative law, the "functional method" has recently
been subjected to criticism. Critics have pointed to its limits and to possible alternative
methods; all three authors discussed here are among such critics." Husa writes that the
"situation is however changing, and there are visible cracks everywhere in mainstream
comparative academia" (p. 119), whereas Samuel offers two alternative methods; namely,
a structural one (pp. 96-107) and a hermeneutical one (pp. 108-120). Siems states that
"a plurality of methods may be used in a fruitful way" in that "comparative law serves
various purposes" (p. 33). Indeed, if one wants to compare the doctrinal construction of
law, rather than practical solutions to legal problems, a functional method will be useless,
and other methods will be needed. This pluralist approach to methodology is largely
shared by Husa and Samuel. It is obvious that a comparison of legal systems as systems
will require a more structural approach. Comparing, for example, the English "trust"
17 Husa, chapter 6.VIII "Functionality - Functional Comparative Law" (pp. 118-127); Samuel, chapter 4
"Functional Method" (pp. 65-78) and chapter 5 "Alternatives to Functionalism" (pp. 79-95); Siems, Part I, 2.B
"Functionalism and Universalism in Particular" (pp. 25-33) and 2.C "Critical Analysis" (pp. 33-39).
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with continental trust-like legal constructions will need a more analytical approach:
which rights, duties, competences and the like are included in each of the compared legal
concepts and constructions?
Methodology equally raises epistemological questions. One of these involves the
paradigm orientation of locating law in its cultural, historical, economic, sociological,
and political context. This need is encountered in traditional textbooks on comparative
law, but rarely applied in comparative research. The three discussed introductions to
comparative law focus in a more detailed way on such a contextual approach.'" Husa even
states that law "is, in fact, always law in context" (p. 64). Siems, in particular, offers a broad
overview of what a contextual approach has to offer, such as, for instance, the relevance
of political economy in understanding differences in contract law. He indicates that "that
common law countries tend to be more market-centred and civil law countries more state-
centred"." Moreover, he says that the influence of a strong or weak court system is vital
with regard to the use of legally binding contracts. 20 Siems concludes his chapter on Socio-
legal comparative law in asserting:
By definition, socio-legal comparative law not only considers the positive law but
also other data related to society. These other data may be qualitative or quantitative.
Choosing one or the other type of data can have an impact on the results of the
comparative analysis. Qualitative comparative socio-legal research tends to focus
on the details of particular legal systems and therefore differences between legal
systems, akin to postmodern comparative research. By contrast, quantitative
comparative socio-legal research may be better able to show similarities between
apparently very different legal systems, in this respect akin to its traditional
counterpart. 21
This indicates that the chosen method, even within a contextual approach, is not neutral.
Furthermore, the results one may expect from qualitative methods are rather limited. And
so Siems continues:
In addition, quantitative research often has the ambition of showing causal relations.
... However, the research discussed in this section has illustrated that causalities are
often too complex to prove clear causal links. 2 2
A thorough law-in-context approach requires the use of other disciplines and their
methods. This is not obvious to the average lawyer and comparatist, as he or she has not
been trained for that. Team research could resolve this problem, at least if the internal
communication within that team is good, which means that, for instance, the economist is
" Samuel mainly in chapter 10 "Paradigm Orientations" (pp. 152-172); Husa throughout the book, and more
specifically in chapters 7 (where different context perspectives are discussed at pp. 157-181) and 8 III.C "The
Significance of Context" at pp. 198-200; Siems, also throughout the book and most notably in chapters 1.B.3
"The Three Dimensions of 'Comparative Law in Context' (pp. 7-9) and most of Part I, including chapter 5
"Postmodern Comparative Law" (pp. 97-118) and chapter 6 "Socio-legal Comparative Law" (pp. 119-145) and
in Part III, mainly chapter 8 on "Legal Transplants" (pp. 191-221).
1 Siems at p.1 3 9 , with reference to John Reitz.
20 Siems at pp. 136-137, with reference to Arrighetti, Bachmann & Deakin who compared the situation in
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy (1997).
21 Siems, p. 144, with reference to Roger Cotterrell and David Nelken.
2 Siems, p. 145.
JCL 12:1 277
Review Articles
able to understand the lawyer and vice-versa. This is not easy. Some comparatists have been
trained in or acquainted themselves with another discipline. Husa has a background in
linguistic science, and Siems is familiar with the use of quantitative methods and, to some
extent, economics. Samuel has specialized epistemology, especially with regard to the
social sciences. The expertise in other disciplines facilitates and enriches their comparative
research.
Ideally, in interdisciplinary research the research question should be a research question
in both disciplines. However, the ambition in comparative research is more modest -
and probably has to be - but this equally limits the scope of possible results that these
studies may offer. Whatever the situation, if law in context is unavoidable in comparative
research, at least some interdisciplinarity is unavoidable too.23 This may be limited to
borrowing data or using quantitative or qualitative methods offered by the social sciences,
but with the risk of becoming a methodology without a theoretical framework. This is the
risk of the "numerical comparative law" to which Siems gives attention and which he has
practiced extensively. Within, for instance, a sociological approach, methods are guided
by the theoretical framework(s) offered by sociology. If one uses the same methods within
comparative research, then some theoretical framework needs to be offered. It could be, in
this case, sociological theory or comparative theory. However, because comparative law is
not strongly developed at the level of theory, one has to be careful. In this respect, Samuel
is offering an important contribution to comparative law theory, most notably by applying
to comparative research the schemes of intelligibility developed by Berthelot. 2 4
LEGAL FAMILIES
Traditional textbooks on comparative law have emphasized "legal families" and on a
taxonomy of the legal systems in the world.25 Today, the idea of legal families as fixed
entities, nicely demarcated from each other, has been weakened for several reasons. First,
such taxonomies are based on the written law, whereas the same law may be applied in a
different way in different countries. This is most visible in countries outside Europe, with
a clearly different cultural context, which have imported a European code (for example,
Japan) or retained European law after decolonization (for example, most African countries).
Second, legal systems are constantly developing and have become increasingly mixed
legal systems even if they looked quite "German" or "French" or "English" at a certain
moment in history. The influence of European Union and human rights law has drawn,
for instance, English law closer to continental legal systems and perhaps distanced it from
other Common Law legal systems.
2 As emphasized by Samuel (pp. 23-24) and Siems (pp. 7-9, supported by quotations from Mary Ann Glendon,
Ugo Mattei, and John Reitz). Inter-disciplinarity in comparative legal research is not as such discussed by Husa,
but implicit throughout the book when referring to the use of other disciplines, such as Sociology, Philosophy,
Linguistics, and Economy in chapter 4 "Comparative Law - One of the Legal Disciplines" (pp. 29-48), and when
discussing cultural, economic, historical and geographical factors that may explain differences and similarities
among legal systems in chapter 7 "Comparing - Differences and Similarities" (pp. 147-181).
24 Samuel throughout his book, but most notably in chapter 1VI "Comparative Law as Epistemology" (pp.
21-23).
2 Most influential has been Rene David, Traite elementaire de droit civil compare: introduction a l'etude des droits
etrangers et a la methode comparative (1950) ; as from 1964: Les grands systemes de droit contemporains. Published in
English in 1968 as Major Legal Systems in the World Today, transl. John E. C. Brierley (1968).
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Third, all taxonomies are based on private law 26 and even on the "civil law" portion,
given the great influence of the French Code civil and the German Bilrgerliches GCesetzbuch
worldwide in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These taxonomies do not necessarily
work when it comes to constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, company law,
environmental law, and the like. Thus comparatists are increasingly aware of the limited
relevance of a legal family taxonomy. It has mainly a didactic use, introducing students
to the law elsewhere; and it reduces complexity by making foreign legal systems more
accessible. 27 For comparative research it may offer some basic information, but legal family
taxonomies will not be able to guide such research.
Although Husa and Siems accept to some extent the use of legal families as a taxonomy
in comparative law, they are aware of the limitations. 28 Husa writes (p. 237):
Macro-constructs, such as legal family, are not necessary: the comparatist can do
without macro-constructs. So, if comparative law is practised out of a practical
interest with an intention to carry out objectives of a practical origin, the question
of the classification of the world's legal systems or the results of the classification is
hardly very interesting.
Siems is even more critical (pp. 93-94):
The present and the previous chapter have shown that classifications into legal
families often do not provide an accurate picture. ... The question remains,
however, whether thinking about legal families does not cause more harm than
good. ... It is also perfectly possible to conduct comparative legal research without
using the notion of legal families. ... Thus, to get a proper understanding of the legal
world, the comparatist has to be prepared to find the unexpected, i.e. unexpected
differences between similar countries and unexpected similarities between different
ones. It is suggested that legal families do not help in developing such curiosity.
The idea of creating a taxonomy originated in nineteenth century under the influence of
positive sciences, such as chemistry (the Table of Mendeleev) and biology (the taxonomy of
plants by Linaeus), in an attempt to make legal scholarship more like a "positive science".
The difference is that taxonomies in positive sciences describe and classify natural objects,
whereas legal taxonomy tries to classify constantly changing human constructs, which,
moreover, may strongly influence each other. When the "communist" regimes in Eastern
Europe collapsed, this had as a strange consequence that the "socialist legal family"
equally disappeared in the Zweigert and Kotz taxonomy of private law.2 9 This points to a
critical point in taxonomies, namely, determining the criteria to be used. The problem is
also found in positive sciences as shown, for instance, by the examples of the whale not
being a "fish" but a mammal, or the "planet" Pluto having lost its status as a "planet",
now being merely a "dwarf planet". Comparatists have on the whole failed to explain
their criteria when proposing taxonomies. They started from the intuitive assumption that
26 Husa discusses extensively the recent development of comparative public law as compared to more
traditional comparative private law (pp. 12-15).
27 Husa, p. 237.
2 Husa, chapter 9 "Macro-comparison" (pp. 210-241); Siems, chapter 4 "Mapping the World's Legal Systems"
(pp. 72-94).
2 Zweigert and K6tz, note 9 above.
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the major (private law) legal systems in the world were English, French, and German,
leaving aside the context of the law in the countries which imported one of these laws.
Consequently, such taxonomies are not "objective" classifications, but choices that may be
relevant from some points of view, but irrelevant from others.
CONCLUSION
These recently published introductions to comparative law, its theory and method, show
how this field has developed over the last few decades. Apparent certainties are no longer
taken for granted, if not heavily criticized. These certainties include the acceptance of the
"functional method" as the only or at least predominant method for comparative research,
the "country and Western" approach, which leaves aside non-State legal systems and
non-Western legal cultures, the idea that comparative research would consist in simply
describing (aspects of) two or more legal systems, a uniquely doctrinal approach with little
attention to law's context, and a more or less fixed taxonomy of "legal families". They have
been replaced by a more scholarly approach to comparative law, starting from research
questions and hypotheses, using methods, including those from the social sciences, which
seem appropriate to find answers to those research questions and to test the hypotheses.
This new approach is clearly characterized by pluralism - pluralism as to the kinds of
legal systems compared (not just State law) and a methodological pluralism. Taxonomies
of "legal families" are no longer considered to be important or even useful for comparative
research, but only, if at all, for didactic purposes. The three discussed books represent
very well the new wind blowing through the field of comparative law, making it finally
a scholarly discipline. So, instead of "The End of Comparative Law", as provocatively
announced by Mathias Siems in an article published less than ten years ago," we may well
be witnessing the rebirth of the discipline as a genuinely scholarly field of research.
so Siems, "The End of Comparative Law", The Journal of Comparative Law, 11 (2007), pp. 133-150.
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